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Plumbing for Latin American capital markets
1 
Sudarat Ananchotikul and Barry Eichengreen 
1. Introduction 
If publicity is the measure of progress, then Latin American capital markets are booming. The 
financial press is awash with articles on the growth of local Latin American markets. They 
note that capitalisation of domestic bond markets in the seven large Latin American countries 
more than doubled from 1995 to 2005; in the second half of the period alone, it went up by 
more than 60% (see Figure 1). Stock market capitalisation rose by 52% during that same 
period, and trading value, averaged across countries, rose by 86%. Furthermore, foreign 
participation in these markets is booming (see Figure 2). 
Figure 1 
Bond market capitalisation by region
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“Advanced countries” refers to Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States; “East Asia” refers to China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; “Latin  America” refers to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. 
1  As a percentage of GDP. 
Sources: World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators. 
However, measured by levels rather than rates of change and compared with other regions, 
capital market development in Latin America continues to be disappointing. Bond markets 
relative to GDP are small when compared not only to advanced industrial countries but also 
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to emerging East Asian markets.
2 The most developed segment is government bonds, 
reflecting Latin America’s history of deficits. Although some countries, like Mexico, have 
successfully issued fixed-rate bonds and lengthened maturities, many others have 
maintained sovereign debt that is short in duration and variable in rate. Furthermore, by the 
standards of its government bond markets, the region’s corporate bond markets are 
minuscule, whether measured by capitalisation, the number of firms issuing bonds or foreign 
investor participation.
3 Maturities in this market segment are especially short. Scarcely 10% 
of corporate bonds issued in Latin America during 2000–05 were at fixed rates and of either 
medium- or long-term duration, compared to nearly 90% of those issued in emerging East 
Asia. Many corporate debt securities are not traded for extended periods. The absence of 
current price quotes prevents institutional investors required to market on a regular basis 
from holding such securities, further limiting liquidity through the operation of a destructive 
feedback loop. 
Figure 2 
Evolution of stock markets by region 
Stock market capitalisation
1  Number of listed companies
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For a list of countries included in each region see Figure 1. 
1  As a percentage of GDP.    
2  Total of listed companies in the region at end-year, in thousands.    
3  Value of 
shares traded as a percentage of average market capitalisation. 
Sources: World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators. 
Latin American equity markets are similarly dominated by a small number of companies.
4 Unlike 
in other regions, the number of companies listed on local markets has been falling. Equity market 
capitalisation scaled by GDP is less than a third of that in emerging East Asia. Only Chile and 
perhaps Brazil are doing tolerably well. Liquidity, as measured by bid-ask spreads and turnover, 
remains low; in 2005 the value of shares traded (relative to stock market capitalisation) was a 
mere 17%, compared to 106% in the G7 countries and 64% in East Asia (see Figure 2). 
Inevitably, a balanced assessment yields something of a glass-half-full, glass-half-empty 
picture. While Latin American countries are making progress in developing their financial 
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markets, they are starting out behind other regions. In fact, in terms of a number of important 
indicators – eg corporate debt issuance, stock market capitalisation, and regional stock 
market turnover – the current situation is unsatisfactory. 
There is no shortage of explanations for this situation. Many Latin American countries have 
long histories of macroeconomic instability, evidenced by chronic budget deficits, high 
inflation and volatile business cycles. In addition, macroeconomic instability is often 
accompanied by financial instability in the form of banking, debt, and currency crises,
5 which 
have in turn led to the collapse of profitability and hence of share prices, as well as 
involuntary restructurings whereby governments have unilaterally reduced the claims of 
bondholders. On top of this, governmental instability in the region has caused unpredictable 
changes in investor rights and undermined the security of creditor claims. Against this 
backdrop, it is not surprising that investors have shown little enthusiasm for participating in 
Latin American capital markets. 
At a deeper level, the underdevelopment of financial markets reflects the limits of the 
supporting infrastructure, or what might be called the “plumbing” of capital markets. Investor 
rights are weak; shareholders often have limited voting rights, making it difficult to challenge 
entrenched management. Judicial proceedings are opaque and uncertain, rendering 
bankruptcy procedures time-consuming and expensive and making it difficult for creditors to 
recover principal and interest arrears and to attach collateral. According to conventional 
measures of investor and creditor protection, Chile, the highest-ranked Latin American 
country, has values that are below the average for emerging East Asia.
6 
Another problem related to infrastructure is that clearing and settlement systems, especially 
in the region’s smaller markets, are often underdeveloped. An efficient clearing and 
settlement system involves trade matching to ensure that the orders booked by the buyer 
and the seller are identical and can be accepted by an exchange’s clearing house for 
settlement; a delivery-versus-payment process that ensures that transfers of securities and 
cash are final and certain; and a central securities depository that operates an electronic 
book-entry system, permitting the physical movement of actual securities to be limited. Such 
an infrastructure would certainly make participation in the local market more attractive. 
Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina have made significant progress in this area, but other countries 
lag behind. 
Trading platforms are similarly inefficient or underdeveloped, and information on transactions 
is often limited. Countries in other parts of the world have made a significant effort to address 
problems like this. Malaysia, for example, has established a bond information trading system 
in which dealers are required to enter price and quantity information within 10 minutes of 
completing a trade; this information then becomes available to other screen subscribers. The 
Thai Bond Market Association requires traders to report transactions within three minutes 
and distributes this information to its members four times a day. South Korea operates a 
similar system, and Indonesia plans to move in the same direction.
7 
One of two approaches could foster Latin American capital markets. The first approach 
would be hands-off: with recent movements towards macroeconomic and financial stability 
and improvements in sustained growth, it is probably just a matter of time before the markets 
develop. The second would be more direct, addressing the infrastructure needs of local 
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markets – in other words, fostering their operation by fixing the “plumbing.” With the proper 
infrastructure in place, it would be easier to eliminate the remaining shortcomings of the 
region’s markets, whether they be the difficulty of issuing long-term fixed-rate corporate debt 
securities, the small number of listed firms or the dearth of liquidity. 
This paper documents the challenges and rewards of addressing these plumbing problems, 
taking corporate governance reform as a case study. We first describe the progress that has 
taken place in corporate governance reform. We then address the question of why progress 
has not been faster. Finally, we explore the benefits of such reform for the development of 
capital markets. Throughout, we draw comparisons between Latin America and East Asia, 
Europe, and the United States. 
2.  Corporate governance as a case study 
Corporate governance lends itself to the study of financial market plumbing for several 
reasons. First, the multilaterals cite problems in corporate governance as an explanation for 
financial instability and the underdevelopment of financial markets. Official post-mortems on 
the Asian crisis described the shortcomings of corporate governance.
8 These post-mortems 
blamed principal-agent problems for the extensive leverage and excessive dependence on 
short-term foreign-currency-denominated debt that rendered the corporate and financial 
sectors so fragile. They pointed to inaccurate information about corporate finances as an 
explanation for why investors scrambled out of Asian markets. Subsequently, the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and Bank for International Settlements (BIS), among others, stressed 
the need for corporate governance reform.
9 
Similarly, weaknesses in Latin American corporate governance are widely cited as an 
explanation for why the region does not have larger capital markets. Financial transparency 
is lacking among publicly traded companies and issuers of debt, creating scope for 
management and directors, working together, to appropriate the residual cash flow of the firm 
at the expense of outside investors. Moreover, minority investors have limited ability to 
capture the residual cash flow of the firm even when they know that it exists. They have 
limited voting rights. Typically they must marshal a relatively large share of investors in order 
to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. Even then, shares are often blocked before 
the shareholders’ meeting.
10 All this makes it difficult for minority shareholders to challenge 
the decisions of management and a captive board of directors. Given the ease with which 
cash flow can be disguised and the difficulties that investors face when attempting to assert 
their rights, it is not surprising that Latin America does not have larger capital markets. 
Second, effective corporate governance is not something that can be legislated. Rather, it 
emerges from the interplay of the public and private sectors. Regulators can establish 
guidelines for governance – voting rules, the appointment of independent directors, and so 
forth – but how decisions are reached and how those making them are held accountable 
depends on how firms implement those decisions and on how investors react. Corporate 
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governance thus epitomises the challenges of reform in a world where outcomes depend not 
only on official decisions but also on market reactions.
11 
Third, high-profile management scandals in the United States are a reminder that even 
countries with sophisticated financial markets have corporate governance problems. Insofar 
as the United States has not been able to solve this problem, we might reasonably ask 
whether it is realistic to ask emerging markets to do so. 
Fourth, there is disagreement on how best to provide effective corporate governance and 
therefore on what reforms are desirable. Even among advanced countries with relatively 
sophisticated financial markets – in particular, the United States and European countries – 
there is disagreement on the specifics of corporate governance reform. This lack of 
agreement in part reflects different analytical perspectives. However, it also results from 
differences in economic structure – for example, the fact that bank-based financial systems 
remain more prevalent in Europe.
12 
Similarly, in the context of the emerging market, questions arise about the suitability of 
one-size-fits-all governance reform advice. Legislation and regulations tailored to the 
circumstances of high-income countries may have very different effects in Latin America, 
where information is not forthcoming, cross-shareholding is common, and family control is 
pervasive. Governance that relies on the accurate and timely provision of accounting 
information may be ill-suited where the supply of independent accountants and auditors is 
limited and the accounting profession’s self-regulatory body is weak.
13 Furthermore, 
attempting to prevent management from pursuing private agendas by giving large 
shareholders more power may not work in an emerging market setting where the firms are 
heavily family-owned and -controlled, the majority owner is the manager and the problem 
instead is the exploitation of outside shareholders by large blockholders.
14 As Capaul (2003) 
notes, family-owned and -run firms continue to dominate the listed sector in many Latin 
American countries. Observations like these prompt questions about the suitability for the 
region of advanced-country models. 
2.1 Analysis 
Our analysis makes use of the work of de Nicolo et al (2006). These authors have 
constructed outcome-based measures of the quality of corporate governance for a wide 
sample of countries for the period 1994–2003. “Outcome-based” means looking not at 
legislation but at what firms and markets actually do. This indicator of corporate governance 
quality has three components: 
(1)  The share of the 40 most important accounting items, as identified by the Center for 
International Financial Analysis and Research of Princeton University, on which the 
largest companies (top 10 manufacturing companies as measured by total assets in 
each country) disclose information. The idea here is that greater accounting 
transparency means that individual investors have more information about the ability 
of the firm to meet its debt service obligations and about residual cash flow. 
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12  On this, see Enriques and Volpin (2007). 
13  See Alba et al (1998). 
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(2)  A measure of earnings smoothing, constructed as one minus the Spearman rank 
correlation between changes in cash flow (before accounting adjustments) and 
changes in profits (after accounting adjustments), both normalised by total assets, 
for each country and year. This speaks to the fact that accounting transparency may 
be meaningless if accounts are easily manipulated. 
(3)  A measure of stock price synchronicity constructed from the covariation of each 
firm’s weekly return with the market capitalisation-weighted weekly return. The idea 
in this case is that when firms make little information available about their financial 
condition, investors will be forced to infer the facts from economy-wide 
developments, causing share prices for different firms to move together.
15 
Like any summary measure of something as multifaceted as corporate governance, this one 
has its limitations. The number of items on which firms disclose accounting information tells 
us nothing about the accuracy of that information. Estimating earnings smoothing is more 
difficult for emerging markets than it is for advanced countries because of the absence of 
information on cash flow for many firms. Individual stock prices can move together to a 
greater or lesser extent for reasons other than the limited availability of information on 
individual firms’ outcomes and prospects – for example, because of changes in the 
prevalence of common stocks. 
Other limitations relate to the fact that the three measures making up the index all focus on 
transparency about information relevant to estimating residual cash flow, which is the 
variable ultimately of interest to shareholders. Better accounting means more information 
about the magnitude of residual cash flow; a higher correlation between underlying cash flow 
and profits as reported similarly tells us about the payout to which shareholders are entitled. 
But neither measure tells us about the ability of investors to capture that residual cash flow, 
which might be diverted by management and captive directors if voting rights are weak and 
legal enforcement is costly and time-consuming. Whether the valuations of different firms 
move together is arguably more informative about these last aspects of corporate 
governance. The prices of the shares of individual companies will co-vary with one another 
not only when outside investors have relatively little information about the financial condition 
of individual firms, leading them to infer it from economy-wide conditions, but also when they 
are not confident of being able to capture idiosyncratic variations in cash flow. But this 
measure of the dispersion of individual share prices is subject to the other problems 
described above. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, we would argue that the outcome-based measure of de 
Nicolo et al (2005) tells us more about what firms and investors do than do the statute- and 
regulation-based alternatives.
16 This index and its components are available for 41 countries, 
including 19 emerging markets (10 of which are in Asia), annually for the period 1994–2003. 
Using the same sources and following the same methods as these authors, we updated the 
three sub-indices through 2005. 
The evolution of corporate governance for the full sample, individual regions, and emerging 
and advanced countries is shown in Table 1 and Figure 3. There appear to have been 
improvements in corporate governance in both Asia and Latin America, although progress 
has been a bit slower in Asia. This advancement suggests a tendency towards convergence 
in corporate governance quality across emerging regions. Latin America and Asia both 
experienced relatively little improvement prior to 1998,
17 and then faster progress 
                                                  
15  And giving management greater scope for diverting residual cash flow. 
16  This index also has some strengths relative to its predecessors. For example, it does not focus exclusively on 
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subsequently, which suggests that later reforms were prompted not only by the Asian crisis 
but also by the general push from the multilaterals and the pressures of financial 
globalisation. We report some further evidence on this below. 
 
Table 1 
Evolution of corporate governance quality (CGQ), 1995–2005 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
All  58.7 60.2 58.0 58.9 60.7 61.1 61.0 63.2 63.9 64.7 65.2 
Asia  57.0 58.8 57.7 58.2 59.7 60.7 59.9 60.7 62.2 61.3 61.7 
Latin  America  52.4 54.7 50.0 53.2 55.4 56.7 54.3 58.9 59.1 60.6 62.4 
Europe  60.9 62.2 59.9 60.0 61.9 61.7 61.6 64.6 65.2 65.9 65.5 
Others  62.8 63.3 62.9 63.6 65.3 65.7 69.0 68.6 69.0 72.0 74.0 
Emerging 
markets 
55.4 57.5 54.5 56.2 57.5 58.3 57.4 59.3 60.4 60.9 61.6 
Advanced 
countries 
61.0 62.1 60.5 60.8 63.0 63.2 63.5 65.9 66.4 67.3 67.8 
M e m o :              
United  States  72.2 72.6 72.3 71.9 74.8 77.7 76.5 76.7 74.6 79.8 79.9 
Japan  57.2 59.3 59.8 62.0 64.2 63.8 62.9 65.7 64.0 64.4 66.4 
See Appendix Table A2 for grouping of sample countries by region. 
Source: Corporate governance indices from 1995 to 2003 from de Nicolo, Laeven, and Ueda (2006), extended 
through 2005 by authors. 
 
Figure 3 
Corporate governance index (CGQ)
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For a list of countries included in each region see Figure 1. 
1  CGQ index ranges from 0 (worst) to 100 (best) 
Source: De Nicolo, Laeven and Ueda (2006); 2004 and 2005 figures updated by authors. BIS Papers No 36  117
 
 
Of interest are the improvements in the quality of corporate governance as measured by this 
index in several Latin American countries (see Figure 3). Our outcome-based measures 
suggest the largest improvements in Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Interestingly, the 
efforts of regulators and the stock exchange in São Paulo (the Bolsa de Valores de São 
Paulo, or BOVESPA) to upgrade transparency in Brazil do not yet show up in terms of visibly 
improved corporate governance quality.
18 
2.2 Determinants 
We next address the question of why progress has been more rapid in some places than in 
others. We regress corporate governance quality on a vector of country-specific economic and 
political characteristics and include alternative measures of the political system such as the 
stability of the government and the Polity Index, which measures the degree to which the regime 
is democratic or autocratic. We also include past capital inflows as a measure of the importance 
of foreign investors, who can be active in pressing for improvements in corporate governance. 
Indicators of trade and financial openness similarly speak to the question of whether more 
contact with foreign markets creates pressure for better corporate governance quality. Per capita 
GDP (in logs) is a proxy for the general level of economic and financial development. Following 
La Porta et al (1998) and Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2007), we include the origin of the legal 
system as a predetermined influence on the strength of investor rights. Credit provided by the 
banking system is a measure of the development of financial intermediation and speaks to 
whether banks and capital markets are substitutes or complements. The level of the lending rate 
captures both the competitiveness of the banking system and the degree of macroeconomic 
stability. The number of parent enterprises is a proxy for the population of large firms in a country. 
Finally, we consider some individual indicators of financial stability: the stability of the exchange 
rate, whether there has been a recent banking crisis, and the number of years the country has 
been under an IMF programme. 
Table 2 shows summary statistics on these variables; Table 3 shows the correlation matrix; 
and Table A1 presents further information on definition and sources. We plot a number of 
these variables in Figures 4 and 5. The first panel of Figure 4 confirms our hypothesis that 
corporate governance improves with per capita GDP, which is a proxy for the general level of 
economic and institutional development. A number of Latin American countries – including 
Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and, most visibly, Venezuela – are negative outliers from the 
general relationship. This is indicative of the poor quality of corporate governance in the 
region, even when we control for general levels of economic and institutional development.
19 
                                                  
18  In 2001 the BOVESPA created the Novo Mercado as a mechanism to enable firms to become listed by 
signalling the high quality of their corporate governance. Companies listed on the Novo Mercado must comply 
with one-share, one-vote rules; abide by international accounting standards; and have a free float (a share of 
issues not in the hands of controlling shareholders) of at least 25%. 






Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Corporate governance quality (0 to 100)  451  61.42  7.17  28.60  89.20 
Accounting standards (0 to 100)  435  84.21  4.06  66.30  93.35 
Earnings smoothing (0 to 100)  451  19.22  12.04  0.00  101.01 
Stock price synchronicity (0 to 100)  451  82.25  10.35  38.50  96.00 
Private bond market capitalisation (% GDP) 439  24.86  26.42  0.00  145.62 
Public bond market capitalisation (% GDP)  439  36.47  24.86  0.21  147.89 
Stock market capitalisation (% GDP)  451  77.88  72.51  3.61  566.18 
Number of listed companies  451  858  1428  50  8851 
Stock turnover ratio 451  72.41  68.74  1.31  623.59 
Government stability index (0 to 12)  451  8.73  1.82  4  12 
Polity index (–10 to 10)  451  7.74  4.07  –7  10 
Cumulative capital inflows (% GDP)  451  33.04  40.42  0.63  299.88 
English legal origin dummy  451  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Real GDP per capita (in log)  451  8.84  1.92  0.12  10.90 
Domestic credit by banking sector  
(% GDP)  451 97.16  45.97 8.58  258.50 
Lending interest rates  451  13.02  14.76  1.68  103.30 
Number of parent enterprises  451  1483  2097  0  9356 
Financial openness  451  7.03  10.23  0.07  96.38 
Trade  openness  451  77.56 56.73 16.30  383.06 
Exchange rate stability index (0 to 10)  451  8.96  1.82  0  10 
Cumulative years under IMF 
programmes  451 1.34  3.79  0  23 
Currency crisis indicator  451  0.04  0.20  0  1 
Banking crisis indicator  451  0.12  0.32  0  1 
Data on private and public bond market capitalisation are unavailable for Israel throughout the sample period 
(1995–2005). 













































































stability 0.112**  1.000 
  




GDP) 0.126***  0.194*** –0.147***   1.000 
  
Log real GDP 
per capita  0.328***  0.022  0.388*** 0.249***   1.000 
  
English legal 





GDP)  0.310*** 0.198*** 0.185*** 0.212*** 0.495*** 0.155*** 1.000 
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enterprises  0.213*** 0.002  0.182*** –0.145*** 0.285*** –0.267*** 0.338*** –0.163*** 1.000 
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openness   0.078  0.152*** –0.196*** 0.805*** 0.190*** 0.324*** 0.285*** –0.254*** –0.119** 0.546*** 1.000   
Exchange 
rate stability  0.126***   0.059    0.005  0.118** 0.388*** 0.150*** 0.185*** –0.538*** 0.056  0.104** 0.131*** 1.000 
 
Banking crisis 
dummy –0.203***  –0.016  –0.195*** –0.109** –0.311*** –0.074  –0.043 0.309*** –0.013  –0.138***  0.019  –0.196***   1.000 
Years under 
IMF 
programmes  –0.162*** –0.057  –0.140*** –0.124*** –0.335*** –0.150*** –0.366*** 0.175*** –0.198*** –0.144***
–
0.183*** –0.035 0.173*** 
The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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The second panel of Figure 4 suggests that the quality of corporate governance rises with 
government stability. It suggests further that the poor quality of corporate governance in 
Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela and Colombia has been associated with low levels of government 
stability. Conversely, Colombia, Argentina and especially Venezuela deviate from the general 
relationship, suggesting that governmental instability does not account for everything.  
The third panel shows that countries with more democratic governments are likelier to have 
effective corporate governance. However, Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela again do not 
fit the pattern. Cumulative capital flows are positively related to the quality of corporate 
governance, although it is possible that this relationship is driven by a few observations. 
Finally, domestic credit provided by the banking system and the number of parent 
enterprises are positively related to the quality of corporate governance. It would be nice to 
be able to say whether the average relationship in Latin America is different from that of 
other regions. Unfortunately, we do not have a sufficient number of observations for Latin 
America to estimate the same equations separately for the region. 
For the sake of comparison, Figures 5A and 5B show these same scatter plots separately by 
region. 
We estimated the equations on the full sample with random effects. In doing so, we followed 
the Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests, which show that random effects are more accurate 
than fixed effects and simple pooling.
20 Column 1 of Table 4 shows the benchmark 
specification. That countries with more stable governments appear to have better corporate 
governance may reflect the greater willingness of politicians to invest in the upfront costs of 
reform that yield returns down the road. In contrast, it does not seem to matter whether that 
government is more or less democratic. This is surprising, based on what we might observe 
from the simple bivariate relationship in the third panel of Figure 4. This finding is, however, 
consistent with the larger literature on the economic effects of democracy. Past capital 
inflows scaled by GDP translate into stronger present corporate governance, possibly 
because foreign investors press for improvements in practice. 
In addition, countries with a common-law tradition have better corporate governance, 
reflecting the stronger rights and voice of outside shareholders and, presumably, their 
greater activism. Countries with low lending rates also appear to have relatively strong 
corporate governance. Low lending rates may reflect stable economic conditions, which 
means the government has more time and resources to devote to corporate governance 
rather than having to attend to other economic problems. Doidge et al (2004) observe that 
where external finance is more readily available, the incentives for firms to improve corporate 
governance are greater. Finally, the number of parent enterprises (that is, multinational 
enterprises with subsidiaries abroad) enters positively in the benchmark specification. This 
number is a proxy for the number of large corporations, which in turn reflects the level of 
corporate sector development. It is possible that countries with a greater number of large 
corporations are more pressed to place them under rigorous governance standards, and 
these firms are seen to be better able to comply with stringent regulation. Analogous to this, 
some countries may hesitate to enforce rigid governance standards because their many 
small- and medium-sized companies would find it costly to comply with the rules. 
                                                  
20  Reassuringly, the key results carry over when we estimate these relationships instead, using fixed effects.  




CGQ index (y-axis) and explanatory variables (x-axis)
1 
Cross section, average 1995–2005 
Log real GDP per capita
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Asia refers to China (CN), Hong Kong SAR (HK), India (IN), Indonesia (ID), Japan (JP), Malaysia (MY), 
Pakistan (PK), Philippines (PH), Singapore (SG), South Korea (KR) and Thailand (TH); Europe refers to 
Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland 
(IE), Israel (IR), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), 
Switzerland (CH) and United Kingdom (UK); Latin America refers to Argentina (AR), Brazil (BR), Chile (CL), 
Colombia (CO), Mexico (MX), Peru (PE) and Venezuela (VE); Others refers to Australia (AU), Canada (CA), 
New Zealand (NZ), South Africa (ZA), Turkey (TK) and United States (US). 
1    CGQ index (y-axis) against each variable (x-axis); CGQ index ranges from 0 (worst) to 100 (best).    
2  Domestic credit by banking sector as a percentage of GDP.    
3  The index ranges from 0 (least stable 
governments) to 12 (most stable governments).    
4  The index ranges from –10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 
(strongly democratic). 
Sources: See Table A1 in the Appendix for data sources and definitions.  




CGQ index and explanatory variables in Asia and Europe
1 
Cross section, average 1995–2005 
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1  CGQ index (y-axis) against each variable (x-axis); CGQ index ranges from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). See 
Figure 4 for country codes.    
2  Domestic credit by banking sector as a percentage of GDP.    
3  The index 
ranges from 0 (least stable governments) to 12 (most stable governments).    
4  The index ranges from –10 
(strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). 
Sources: See Table A1 in the Appendix for data sources and definitions.  




CGQ index and explanatory variables in Latin America and other countries
1 
Cross section, average 1995–2005 
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1  CGQ index (y-axis) against each variable (x-axis); CGQ index ranges from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). See 
Figure 4 for country codes.    
2  Domestic credit by banking sector as a percentage of GDP.    
3  The index 
ranges from 0 (least stable governments) to 12 (most stable governments).    
4  The index ranges from –10 
(strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). 
Sources: See Table A1 in the Appendix for data sources and definitions.  





Determinants of corporate governance quality 
First stage, GLS random effects 
Dependent variable:  
corporate governance quality (CGQ)   
(1) (2) (3) 
Excluded instruments:  
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Dummy for Latin America    –3.577 
(1.21) 














Observations 451  451  451 
Number of country ID  41 41 41 
R
2  0.073 0.203 0.225 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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A number of other variables do not appear to influence the quality of corporate governance 
significantly when included in the multivariate regression.
21 Interestingly, GDP per capita is 
among these variables, which indicates that characteristics that are very specific to the 
countries account for variations in the quality of corporate governance. Per capita GDP, 
which captures aspects of economic and institutional development not directly measured 
elsewhere, has no residual explanatory power.
22  
Other insignificant variables include domestic credit provided by the banking sector,
23 the 
incidence of recent banking crises,
24 the stability of the exchange rate, and the number of 
recent years in which the country was under an IMF programme.
25  
Another interesting result is the negative coefficient on the dummy variable for Asia. That is, 
after controlling for more than a dozen economic and political characteristics, the quality of 
corporate governance in Asia continues to lag behind that in other regions. Since the majority 
of non-Asian countries in the sample are advanced economies, this would appear to reflect 
the differential between Asia and that grouping. 
In column 3 of the table we add dummy variables for Latin America and other emerging 
markets (South Africa and Turkey). In contrast to the dummy variable for Asia, these dummy 
variables are not significantly different from zero at standard confidence levels. This is telling 
us that, to the extent that corporate governance in Latin America is inferior to that in other 
regions, this is entirely explicable by observable characteristics of countries – their 
macroeconomic policies, the stability of their political systems, the influence of foreign 
investors, and so forth. It is not necessary to invoke, in addition, some special feature of the 
Latin American countries and their history not captured by the other independent variables. 
In short, the quality of corporate governance varies across countries for both systematic and 
idiosyncratic reasons. Systematic reasons include the structure of the legal system and how 
effectively it empowers outside investors to lobby for information disclosure and 
representation; the presence of foreign investors, who are likely to lobby for improvements in 
corporate governance; and political stability and development, which influences the 
readiness of government to invest in governance reform. Additionally, in Asia, the dominance 
of bank finance and the number of parent enterprises appear to be negatively associated 
with the quality of corporate governance. 
                                                  
21  However, Table 3 (the correlation matrix) shows that each of them has a statistically significant correlation with 
the measure of corporate governance quality. 
22  The adjusted R
2 of this equation declines only from 0.203 to 0.200 when per capita GDP is omitted. 
23  This is included on the grounds that an active banking sector is sometimes seen as pushing for improved 
corporate governance. 
24  Banking crises may disrupt the process of market development, but they do provide additional impetus for 
reforms. Evidently, these effects cancel each other out. 
25  Any tendency for IMF tutelage to lead to improved corporate governance appears to be neutralised in the 
aggregate by cases of countries that were continuously under IMF programmes and in which transparency 
problems were rife. This variable is cumulative years under an IMF programme beginning in 1960. Its 
maximum value is 23 – representing Argentina, which was continuously under IMF programmes from 1983 
through 2005. Similarly, although institutional strengthening, including better corporate governance, is 
sometimes seen as a prerequisite for moving to greater exchange rate flexibility – firms must then limit 
currency mismatches and other exchange rate-related balance sheet risks – this effect seems to be 
neutralised in the aggregate by the tendency for some countries with weak governance to exhibit relatively 
high levels of currency instability.  




We now examine the impact of corporate governance quality on financial development. We 
treat corporate governance as endogenous, recognising that its quality can both be affected 
by and affect financial development.  
We construct the fitted value of corporate governance using all the exogenous variables in 
the second stage as included instruments and the political variables and our measures of the 
presence of foreign investors as excluded instruments. We are not aware of previous 
arguments or evidence that the structure of the political system is important for financial 
development, which is why we are comfortable about omitting the political variables from the 
second stage and using them as instruments for corporate governance.
26 Omitting 
cumulative capital flows from the second stage is likely to be more controversial. However, 
dropping this variable from our list of instruments does not alter our key results, as we show 
below.
27 
In the second-stage regressions, we consider the impact of corporate governance, along with 
a vector of controls, on the capitalisation of private bond markets (as a percentage of GDP), 
government bond markets (as a percentage of GDP), stock market capitalisation (as a 
percentage of GDP), the number of listed companies, and the turnover ratio on the stock 
market (in per cent). The results are in Table 5. The key finding is that the exogenous 
component of corporate governance as we measure it has a positive effect on all these 
variables, but this effect is weakest in the case of public sector bond market capitalisation. 
This makes sense: stronger corporate governance works directly to make investment by 
outsiders in private corporations more attractive, but it will stimulate investment in public debt 
securities only indirectly, insofar as private and public bond markets are complements; that 
is, they use the same market infrastructure, have a similar customer base, and so on.
28 
When we estimate the same equations by pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), ignoring 
the possibility of simultaneity, the significant positive effects on private bond market 
capitalisation, stock market capitalisation, the number of listed companies, and the measure 
of stock liquidity remain (see column 1 of Table 6). However, only the positive effect on 
private bond market capitalisation remains when we use fixed or random effects panel 
estimators without instrumental variables (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 6). This underscores 
the importance of recognising the endogeneity of corporate governance.
29 
                                                  
26  This is in contrast to work like that of Roe (2003), who argues that political variables should be significantly 
associated with corporate governance itself – this being precisely the argument relied on here. 
27  See the section below on robustness. On the other hand, dropping this variable does create some other 
sources of econometric discomfort, as we explain in that section, requiring us to modify the specification 
slightly. 
28  When we include private bond market capitalization as a determinant of public bond market capitalization, 
there is only weak evidence that a larger private market stimulates public bond market development. When we 
substitute public bond market size lagged one year in the first column, the key results do not change. In 
addition, lagged public bond market size is not significant (coefficient = -0.021, t-statistic = 0.66). Similarly, 
when we add private bond market capitalization lagged one year in the second column, the key results remain 
the same and the lagged private bond market size is not significant (coefficient = 0.044, t-statistic = 0.58). 
29  In the case of private bond markets, although the effect is positive and significant across all regression 
models, the fact that the coefficient on corporate governance quality in the OLS regressions is smaller than in 
the instrumental variable (IV) regressions suggests that the reverse relationship, from bond market size to 
corporate governance quality, may be negative.  




Effects of corporate governance quality 
Second stage, IV regressions  
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Observations 439  439  451  451  451 
Number of country ID  40  40  41  41  41 
R
2 0.656  0.011  0.472  0.313  0.227 
Corporate governance quality is the fitted value from regressing the CGQ index on a set of instrumental 
variables as in column 2 of Table 4. Instruments used are: government stability, polity index and cumulative 
capital inflows as a percentage of GDP. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  





Alternative specifications for the effects of corporate  
governance quality on financial development 
Coefficient on corporate governance quality index 
Dependent variable 
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For the OLS and GLS models, each financial development variable is regressed on the CGQ index and the set 
of independent variables analogous to columns 1 through 5 in Table 5. For the IV models, first-stage regressions 
are analogous to column 2 of Table 4 (with English dummy origin, number of parent enterprises, and dummy for 
Asia dropped for the fixed effects IV regression). CGQ Index in the second-stage IV regressions is the fitted 
value from the first stage. Instruments used are: government stability, polity index and cumulative capital inflows 
as a percentage of GDP. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
2.4 Robustness 
We performed a number of sensitivity analyses to check robustness. To start, we estimated 
alternative specifications for the first stage, as reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7. We 
dropped the insignificant exchange rate, banking crises, and IMF dummy variables. We then 
dropped the measures of financial openness, trade openness, and domestic credit provided 
by the banking sector. The key results carried over. 
Second, we estimated our equations using fixed rather than random effects. This approach 
required dropping legal origin, the region dummies, and the number of parent enterprises 
because these variables do not vary over time. The first-stage results still hold for the other 
variables except that the coefficient trade openness now becomes positive and significant. 
The key results from the second stage are unchanged; the remaining coefficients all have the 
same sign and continue to differ significantly from zero at standard confidence levels. 
Third, we dropped cumulative capital inflows from the first stage (column 3). We worried that 
the identifying power of this variable derives from the experience of a few outliers such as 
Hong Kong SAR. In addition, one might worry about the exclusion restriction: past capital 
flows may affect not just the quality of corporate governance but also the capitalisation and 
liquidity of financial markets directly. Reassuringly, our key results – in particular, the sign and 
significance level of the corporate governance variable in the second stage – remain the same. 
  




Determinants of corporate governance quality robustness checks 
Dependent variable:  
corporate governance quality (CGQ) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Excluded instruments:      
















Cumulative capital inflows (% GDP)   0.039***
(3.38) 
 0.042***
(4.71)    
Average CGQ in other countries in the 
same region     
 0.373*** 
(4.59) 
Included instruments:      
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Number of parent enterprises  0.002 
(0.24)    
Financial openness  –0.026 
(1.35)      
Trade openness  0.012 
(0.91)    








Dummy for Latin America 
    
Dummy for South Africa and Turkey 
    


















Observations  451 451 451 451 
Number of country ID  41  41  41  41 
R
2  0.206 0.215 0.234 0.271 
All regressions are estimated using GLS random effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in 
parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  




However, dropping this variable creates a problem of weak instruments.
30 The textbook 
treatment for this problem is to find more powerful instruments, which we could do by 
building on work on peer effects and policy diffusion (Simmons and Elkins 2003). Such work 
argues that the probability of a country’s adopting a particular policy reform increases with 
the number of its neighbours who have already done so. One can argue that there is logic for 
including this latter variable – constructed, in the present context, as the quality of corporate 
governance in other countries in the same region – insofar as countries compete for foreign 
capital partly on the basis of how well they represent the interests of investors. This variable 
is plausibly exogenous except perhaps for countries large enough to influence the quality of 
corporate governance throughout the region. It is plausible to exclude it from the second 
stage, there being no reason to expect the quality of corporate governance elsewhere to 
have a first-order impact on the subject country’s financial development. And it is a strong 
instrument. Adding it leaves the sign and significance of the key corporate governance 
variable in the second stage unchanged and eliminates the weak-instrument problem. A 
limitation of this variable is that it is not clear that a country’s economic neighbours are also 
its geographic neighbours. This is why we relegate estimates using this instrument to this 
section on sensitivity analysis. 
Fourth, we looked separately at the impact on market development of the individual 
components of our corporate governance index, having first estimated their determinants 
using the same specification as above. As Table 8 shows, all three elements (adoption of 
accounting standards, tendency not to smooth earnings, and share-price non-synchronicity) 
generally have the expected positive effect on private bond market capitalisation, stock 
market capitalisation, the number of listed companies, and the stock turnover ratio. This 
cumulative positive effect reassures us that the results do not hinge on the behaviour of any 
one component of our corporate governance measure. 
Finally, we considered the number of listed companies scaled by real GDP and by total 
number of business registrations rather than simply the number of listed companies. We 
scaled by GDP to take into account the effect of country size and corporate sector size on 
this variable. For both specifications, the sign and significance of most variables, including 
corporate governance quality, remained unchanged, except for the log of real GDP per 
capita, the coefficient of which now became negative and significant.
31
 
                                                  
30  The F-statistic for the excluded instruments is 15.67 with the measure of cumulative capital inflows included in 
the first stage and 1.33 without. The cutoff for weak instruments is a threshold of 10.00 as suggested by 
Staiger and Stock (1997) for the case of a single endogenous regressor. 
31  We include these specifications in this section on robustness rather than in the results section above because 
it is not clear that real GDP is an appropriate variable to use as a scaling factor for number of listed firms. 
Using the total number of business registrations as a scaling factor is more appropriate. However, doing so 
reduces the number of observations greatly (from 451 to 193 country-years) because of incomplete time-
series data on this variable. In addition, since we already include the number of parent companies in the list of 
controls, we feel justified in entering the number of listed companies as a simple number. Data on total 







Effects of different components of CGQ index 
Second stage, IV regressions 
 Dependent  variable: 
  Private bond market cap
(% GDP) 
Public bond market cap
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Stock market cap 
(% GDP) 
Number of listed 
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variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 453 439 475 453  439 475  465 451 489 466 451 490 465 451 489 
Number of 
country ID  40 40 40 40  40 40  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
R
2  0.655 0.657 0.658 0.005  0.010 0.013  0.452 0.471 0.476 0.281 0.312 0.296 0.221 0.226 0.230 
All regressions are analogous to the full specification in Table 5 with the CGQ index replaced by each of its three components. Results on other independent variables 
omitted. Instruments used are: government stability, polity index and cumulative capital inflows as a percentage of GDP. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in 
parentheses. 



























Latin American countries have made significant progress in developing their capital markets. 
This progress occurs against the backdrop of increasing macroeconomic, financial and 
political stability. In reciprocal fashion, it contributes to the larger environment of stability.  
At the same time, however, the size of corporate bond markets, the number of companies 
listing on equity markets, and market liquidity remain disappointing when compared to other 
regions. Markets that are still relatively narrow and illiquid may prove to be fragile and volatile 
in the event that the economic and financial environment sours – that is, if global growth 
slows and investor risk aversion increases. This fragility may in turn jeopardise the 
consolidation of the region’s newfound macroeconomic stability. 
Accelerating progress in the development of Latin American capital markets is thus a matter 
of some urgency. Viewing capital market development as an organic part of the larger 
process of economic and financial development and waiting for the region’s economies to 
“grow up” is not enough. There are specific actions that governments and policymakers can 
take to foster the development of their capital markets. These actions include creating a 
more efficient market infrastructure – for example, instituting trading platforms or payment 
and settlement systems – and strengthening shareholder and bondholder rights, all of which 
we call the “plumbing” of capital markets. In this paper, we pay particular attention to one 
aspect of this plumbing – namely, corporate governance. 
We find that improvements in corporate governance have been more prevalent in countries 
with stable governments prepared to pay the up-front costs of institutional reform, where 
there are foreign investors prepared to lobby for reform, and where other countries in the 
region are undertaking corporate governance reform. We find that the relevant reforms have 
a significant payoff in terms of the development of equity and corporate bond markets.  
At the same time, comparison of emerging markets in Latin America and elsewhere with 
advanced economies suggests that the process is incomplete. One view of this situation is 
that effective corporate governance is an organic part of the larger process of economic and 
financial development and that countries can close their corporate governance quality gap 
only as their levels of economic and financial development converge with those of the 
advanced countries. Our results support a more optimistic conclusion. The quality of 
corporate governance depends on more than just per capita income as a measure of the 
general level of economic development – it depends also on a number of specific factors, 
suggesting that emerging markets can take specific actions to promote it. Macroeconomic 
stability is good for the development of corporate governance. Opening markets to foreign 
investment can be good for corporate governance. So too is political stability, which gives 
investors voice and governments an incentive to invest in the future.  
Corporate governance quality does not simply reflect the level of financial development – it 
can also affect it. The results we discuss in this paper suggest that corporate governance 
can affect financial development in decidedly positive ways. We suspect that these 
conclusions are more general – that they carry over from corporate governance to other 
aspects of the “plumbing” of capital markets.  





Description of variables and data sources 
Variable Description  Source 
CGQ index  Unweighted average of the 
indicators of accounting standards, 
earning smoothing, and stock price 
synchronicity, ranging from 0 
(worst) to 100 (best) 
De Nicolo, Laeven, and Ueda 
(2006); updated by authors 
Accounting standards 
index 
Number of reported accounting 
items as a percentage of 40 
accounting items 
De Nicolo, Laeven, and Ueda 
(2006); updated by authors 
Earning smoothing index  Rank correlation between cash 
flows and profits across a set of 
firms at each point in time, 
standardised, ranging from 0 (most 
opaque performance) to 100 (least 
opaque performance) 
De Nicolo, Laeven, and Ueda 
(2006); updated by authors 
Stock price synchronicity 
index 
Average R-squared of regressions 
of each company’s stock return on 
country-average return in each 
year, standardised, ranging from 0 
(maximum synchronicity) to 100 
(minimum synchronicity) 
De Nicolo, Laeven, and Ueda 
(2006); updated by authors 
Private bond market 
capitalisation 
Private domestic debt securities 
issued by financial institutions and 
corporations (as a percentage of 
GDP) 




Supplementary data are from 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 
(2000) and national statistical 
databases.  
Public bond market 
capitalisation 
Public domestic debt securities 
issued by the government (as a 
percentage of GDP) 
BIS Domestic and International 
Securities Statistics; 
supplementary data are from Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000) 
and national statistical databases. 
Stock market 
capitalisation 
Value of listed shares as a 
percentage of GDP 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
Number of listed 
companies 
Number of companies listed on the 
national stock market 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
Stock turnover ratio  Ratio of total value of shares 
traded to stock market 
capitalisation 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 
(2000) 
Government stability  Assessment of the government’s 
ability to carry out its declared 
programme(s) and its ability to stay 
in office, ranging from 0 (least 
stable) to 12 (most stable) 
International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG)  
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Table A1 (cont) 
Description of variables and data sources 
Variable Description  Source 
Polity index  Combined scores of polity regime 
characteristics, ranging from -10 
(strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly 
democratic) 
Center for International 
Development and Conflict 
Management (CIDCM), Polity IV 
Project 
<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity>
Cumulative capital inflows  Stock of inward foreign direct 
investment (as a percentage of 
GDP) 
United Nations Conference on 





Stock of outward direct investment 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) database: 
http://stats.unctad.org/fdi 
Legal origin  Dummy variables indicating 
country law originated from English 
law, German law, French law, and 
Scandinavian law 
La Porta et al (1998) 
Log of real GDP per 
capita 
Log of deflated GDP over total 
population 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
Domestic credit by 
banking sector 
Private domestic credit provided by 
deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions (as a 
percentage of GDP) 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
Lending rate  Average lending rates paid by 
commercial banks (in percent) 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) and Global Financial Data 
(GFD) 
Number of parent 
enterprises 
Parent corporations are those 
enterprises that control assets of 
other entities outside their 
respective home countries. 
Typically, “control of assets” 
requires ownership of at least 10% 
of a corporation’s shares or voting 
power (equity capital stake), or its 
equivalent for an unincorporated 
enterprise. 
United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). World Investment 
Report 2005: Transnational 
Corporations and the 
Internationalisation of R&D  




Financial openness  The sum of foreign direct 
investment and portfolio 
investment inflows and outflows 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Raw data from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) 
 
Trade openness  Total value of exports plus imports 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Raw data from World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Exchange stability  Assessment of the appreciation or 
depreciation of a currency against 
the US dollar over a year, ranging 
from 0 (least stable) to 10 (most 
stable) 
International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) 
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Table A1 (cont) 
Description of variables and data sources 
Variable Description  Source 
Years under IMF 
programme(s) 
Cumulative number of years a 
country has been under IMF 
agreements 
Vreeland (2003); updated data 
provided by James Vreeland 
Currency crisis indicator  Dummy variable indicating an 
incidence of a currency crisis 
Glick et al (2004) and Ranciere et 
al (2006) 
Banking crisis indicator  Dummy variable indicating an 
incidence of a banking crisis 
Caprio et al (2003) Banking Crises 
Database, World Bank 
<http://www1.worldbank.org/financ
e/html/database_sfd.html>. 
Updated banking crises data 
provided by Enrica Detragiache 
 
  






Asia Latin  America  Europe  Other 
China Argentina  Austria  Australia 
Hong Kong SAR  Brazil  Belgium  Canada 
India Chile Denmark  New  Zealand 
Indonesia Colombia Finland  South  Africa 
Japan Mexico  France  Turkey 
Korea Peru  Germany  United  States 
Malaysia Venezuela  Greece   
Pakistan   Ireland   
Philippines   Israel   
Singapore   Italy   
Thailand   Netherlands   
  Norway   
  Portugal   
  Spain   
  Sweden   
  Switzerland   
  United  Kingdom   
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